Awake
2003-10-06 17:47:29 UTC
The Times of London has now printed evidence that Blair admitted that Saddam
had no WMD before the war began as was stated by he and Bush as reason for
the illegal invasion of Iraq which has now resulted in the worst quagmire for America
since Vietnam.
Another soldier has been killed on Saturday and another seriously wounded.
The death toll for U.S. soldiers is now 318 and the wounded -which consist of
amputees and worse- numbers at over 1500.
The casualties are mounting faster. By this time next year -and our lying scumbag
leaders assure us that the quagmire shall continue through next year- the casualty
count will number at least 5,000.
For what?
The Jews refuse to make peace and continue to steal the Palestinians land.
This is what the illegal invasion is all about. The missing arms, legs, eyes and lives
are all so the Jews can continue to steal Palestinian land and continue murdering
Palestinians.
When will the Jews in high places be held accountable for their murderous behavior?
Why have Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and the other "neoCONservative" Jews
disappeared from public view and public discussion?
"At a cabinet meeting in late February 2002, Blunkett asked for a discussion on Iraq
and Cook received cries of 'hear, hear' from cabinet colleagues when he argued
that Arab governments regarded Israel, not Iraq, as the real problem for the Middle
East. Cook records it was 'the nearest thing I've heard to a mutiny in cabinet'."
October 05, 2003
Blair 'knew Iraq had no WMD'
David Cracknell, Political Editor
TONY BLAIR privately conceded two weeks before the Iraq war that Saddam
Hussein did not have any usable weapons of mass destruction, Robin Cook, the
former foreign secretary, reveals today.
John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee (JIC), also
"assented" that Saddam had no such weapons, says Cook.
His revelations, taken from a diary that he kept as a senior minister during
the months leading up to war, are published today in The Sunday Times. They
shatter the case for war put forward by the government that Iraq presented "a
real and present danger" to Britain.
Cook, who resigned shortly before the invasion of Iraq, also reveals there was
a near mutiny in the cabinet, triggered by David Blunkett, the home secretary,
when it first discussed military action against Iraq.
The prime minister ignored the "large number of ministers who spoke up against
the war", according to Cook. He also "deliberately crafted a suggestive
phrasing" to mislead the public into thinking there was a link between Iraq
and Al-Qaeda, and he did not want United Nations weapons inspections to be
successful, writes the former cabinet minister.
Cook suggests that the government misled the House of Commons and asked MPs to
vote for war on a "false prospectus".
He also reveals that Blair earlier gave President Bill Clinton a private
assurance that he would support him in military action in Iraq if action in
the UN failed "and it would certainly have been in line with his previous
practice if he had given President Bush a private assurance of British
support".
Cook's long-awaited diaries, published in book form as Point of Departure, are
the first memoir of any member of Blair's cabinet. His disclosures are likely
to lead to renewed calls for a judicial inquiry into the legitimacy of the
war.
The Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly has dealt only with the
question of what the government believed ahead of publication of its Iraq
dossier in September 2002 and whether Downing Street hardened intelligence
reports to make the threat from Saddam seem more compelling.
Cook today opens a new controversy. He says that just days before sending
troops into action, Blair no longer believed Saddam had weapons of mass
destruction ready for firing within 45 minutes, the claim the prime minister
had repeatedly made when arguing the case for war.
Cook reveals that on February 20 this year he was given a briefing by
Scarlett. "The presentation was impressive in its integrity and shorn of the
political slant with which No 10 encumbers any intelligence assessment," Cook
writes in his diary. "My conclusion at the end of an hour is that Saddam
probably does not have weapons of mass destruction in the sense of weapons
that could be used against large-scale civilian targets."
Two weeks later, on March 5, Cook saw Blair. At the time the government was
still trying to get a fresh UN resolution and Cook was still in government as
leader of the Commons.
Cook writes: "The most revealing exchange came when we talked about Saddam's
arsenal. I told him, 'It's clear from the private briefing I have had that
Saddam has no weapons of mass destruction in a sense of weapons that could
strike at strategic cities. But he probably does have several thousand
battlefield chemical munitions. Do you never worry that he might use them
against British troops?'
"[Blair replied:] 'Yes, but all the effort he has had to put into concealment
makes it difficult for him to assemble them quickly for use'."
Cook continues: "There were two distinct elements to this exchange that sent
me away deeply troubled. The first was that the timetable to war was plainly
not driven by the progress of the UN weapons inspections. Tony made no attempt
to pretend that what Hans Blix [the UN's chief weapons inspector] might report
would make any difference to the countdown to invasion.
"The second troubling element to our conversation was that Tony did not try to
argue me out of the view that Saddam did not have real weapons of mass
destruction that were designed for strategic use against city populations and
capable of being delivered with reliability over long distances. I had now
expressed that view to both the chairman of the JIC and to the prime minister
and both had assented in it.
"At the time I did believe it likely that Saddam had retained a quantity of
chemical munitions for tactical use on the battlefield. These did not pose 'a
real and present danger to Britain' as they were not designed for use against
city populations and by definition could threaten British personnel only if we
were to deploy them on the battlefield within range of Iraqi artillery.
"I had now twice been told that even those chemical shells had been put beyond
operational use in response to the pressure from intrusive inspections. I have
no reason to doubt that Tony Blair believed in September that Saddam really
had weapons of mass destruction ready for firing within 45 minutes. What was
clear from this conversation was that he did not believe it himself in March."
Cook asks: "If No 10 accepted that Saddam had no real weapons of mass
destruction which he could credibly deliver against city targets and if they
themselves believed that he could not reassemble his chemical weapons in a
credible timescale for use on the battlefield, just how much of a threat did
they really think Saddam represented?"
He raises "the gravest of political questions. The rules of the Commons
explicitly require ministers to correct the record as soon as they are aware
that they may have misled parliament. If the government did come to know that
the [United States] State Department did not trust the claims in the September
dossier and that some of even their top experts did not believe them, should
they not have told parliament before asking the Commons to vote for war on a
false prospectus?"
Cook decided not to publish his diaries ahead of last week's Labour conference
in Bournemouth. Had he done so, his revelations would have ensured Blair
received a much tougher ride from activists, many of whom are deeply uneasy
about the war.
He reveals that in the months leading up to the war Downing Street aides,
including Alastair Campbell, Blair's former director of communications, and
Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, were obsessed with not falling out with
Washington.
Cook discloses that several cabinet ministers had held misgivings about the
war, not just himself and Clare Short. At a cabinet meeting in late February
2002, Blunkett asked for a discussion on Iraq and Cook received cries of
"hear, hear" from cabinet colleagues when he argued that Arab governments
regarded Israel, not Iraq, as the real problem for the Middle East. Cook
records it was "the nearest thing I've heard to a mutiny in cabinet".
His diary entry of March 7, 2002, a year before the war, says that Blunkett
and Patricia Hewitt, the trade secretary, raised objections at cabinet.
"A momentous moment. A real discussion at cabinet. Tony permitted us to have
the debate on Iraq which David [Blunkett] and I had asked for. For the first
time that I can recall in five years, Tony was out on a limb."
According to Cook, Blunkett asked Blair: "What has changed that suddenly gives
us the legal right to take military action that we didn't have a few months
ago?"
Hewitt warned Blair: "We are in danger of being seen as close to President
Bush, but without any influence over President Bush."
But the prime minister was "totally unfazed" and, when Hewitt again raised
objections at cabinet the following month, Blair refused to be boxed in,
telling colleagues: "The time to debate the legal base for our action should
be when we take that action."
Cook reveals that Bush had wanted to hold a crucial war council with Blair in
London on the weekend before the invasion of Iraq, a move that would have been
a public relations disaster given public hostility to the war. Blair persuaded
Bush to hold the summit in the Azores instead.
By September last year most of the cabinet had fallen into line. At cabinet on
September 23, before parliament was recalled from its summer break, Cook says:
"Personally I found it a grim meeting. Much of the two hours was taken up with
a succession of loyalty oaths for Tony's line."
He says only Estelle Morris, then education secretary, "bravely" reported
public disquiet that Britain was simply following Bush.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
had no WMD before the war began as was stated by he and Bush as reason for
the illegal invasion of Iraq which has now resulted in the worst quagmire for America
since Vietnam.
Another soldier has been killed on Saturday and another seriously wounded.
The death toll for U.S. soldiers is now 318 and the wounded -which consist of
amputees and worse- numbers at over 1500.
The casualties are mounting faster. By this time next year -and our lying scumbag
leaders assure us that the quagmire shall continue through next year- the casualty
count will number at least 5,000.
For what?
The Jews refuse to make peace and continue to steal the Palestinians land.
This is what the illegal invasion is all about. The missing arms, legs, eyes and lives
are all so the Jews can continue to steal Palestinian land and continue murdering
Palestinians.
When will the Jews in high places be held accountable for their murderous behavior?
Why have Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and the other "neoCONservative" Jews
disappeared from public view and public discussion?
"At a cabinet meeting in late February 2002, Blunkett asked for a discussion on Iraq
and Cook received cries of 'hear, hear' from cabinet colleagues when he argued
that Arab governments regarded Israel, not Iraq, as the real problem for the Middle
East. Cook records it was 'the nearest thing I've heard to a mutiny in cabinet'."
October 05, 2003
Blair 'knew Iraq had no WMD'
David Cracknell, Political Editor
TONY BLAIR privately conceded two weeks before the Iraq war that Saddam
Hussein did not have any usable weapons of mass destruction, Robin Cook, the
former foreign secretary, reveals today.
John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee (JIC), also
"assented" that Saddam had no such weapons, says Cook.
His revelations, taken from a diary that he kept as a senior minister during
the months leading up to war, are published today in The Sunday Times. They
shatter the case for war put forward by the government that Iraq presented "a
real and present danger" to Britain.
Cook, who resigned shortly before the invasion of Iraq, also reveals there was
a near mutiny in the cabinet, triggered by David Blunkett, the home secretary,
when it first discussed military action against Iraq.
The prime minister ignored the "large number of ministers who spoke up against
the war", according to Cook. He also "deliberately crafted a suggestive
phrasing" to mislead the public into thinking there was a link between Iraq
and Al-Qaeda, and he did not want United Nations weapons inspections to be
successful, writes the former cabinet minister.
Cook suggests that the government misled the House of Commons and asked MPs to
vote for war on a "false prospectus".
He also reveals that Blair earlier gave President Bill Clinton a private
assurance that he would support him in military action in Iraq if action in
the UN failed "and it would certainly have been in line with his previous
practice if he had given President Bush a private assurance of British
support".
Cook's long-awaited diaries, published in book form as Point of Departure, are
the first memoir of any member of Blair's cabinet. His disclosures are likely
to lead to renewed calls for a judicial inquiry into the legitimacy of the
war.
The Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly has dealt only with the
question of what the government believed ahead of publication of its Iraq
dossier in September 2002 and whether Downing Street hardened intelligence
reports to make the threat from Saddam seem more compelling.
Cook today opens a new controversy. He says that just days before sending
troops into action, Blair no longer believed Saddam had weapons of mass
destruction ready for firing within 45 minutes, the claim the prime minister
had repeatedly made when arguing the case for war.
Cook reveals that on February 20 this year he was given a briefing by
Scarlett. "The presentation was impressive in its integrity and shorn of the
political slant with which No 10 encumbers any intelligence assessment," Cook
writes in his diary. "My conclusion at the end of an hour is that Saddam
probably does not have weapons of mass destruction in the sense of weapons
that could be used against large-scale civilian targets."
Two weeks later, on March 5, Cook saw Blair. At the time the government was
still trying to get a fresh UN resolution and Cook was still in government as
leader of the Commons.
Cook writes: "The most revealing exchange came when we talked about Saddam's
arsenal. I told him, 'It's clear from the private briefing I have had that
Saddam has no weapons of mass destruction in a sense of weapons that could
strike at strategic cities. But he probably does have several thousand
battlefield chemical munitions. Do you never worry that he might use them
against British troops?'
"[Blair replied:] 'Yes, but all the effort he has had to put into concealment
makes it difficult for him to assemble them quickly for use'."
Cook continues: "There were two distinct elements to this exchange that sent
me away deeply troubled. The first was that the timetable to war was plainly
not driven by the progress of the UN weapons inspections. Tony made no attempt
to pretend that what Hans Blix [the UN's chief weapons inspector] might report
would make any difference to the countdown to invasion.
"The second troubling element to our conversation was that Tony did not try to
argue me out of the view that Saddam did not have real weapons of mass
destruction that were designed for strategic use against city populations and
capable of being delivered with reliability over long distances. I had now
expressed that view to both the chairman of the JIC and to the prime minister
and both had assented in it.
"At the time I did believe it likely that Saddam had retained a quantity of
chemical munitions for tactical use on the battlefield. These did not pose 'a
real and present danger to Britain' as they were not designed for use against
city populations and by definition could threaten British personnel only if we
were to deploy them on the battlefield within range of Iraqi artillery.
"I had now twice been told that even those chemical shells had been put beyond
operational use in response to the pressure from intrusive inspections. I have
no reason to doubt that Tony Blair believed in September that Saddam really
had weapons of mass destruction ready for firing within 45 minutes. What was
clear from this conversation was that he did not believe it himself in March."
Cook asks: "If No 10 accepted that Saddam had no real weapons of mass
destruction which he could credibly deliver against city targets and if they
themselves believed that he could not reassemble his chemical weapons in a
credible timescale for use on the battlefield, just how much of a threat did
they really think Saddam represented?"
He raises "the gravest of political questions. The rules of the Commons
explicitly require ministers to correct the record as soon as they are aware
that they may have misled parliament. If the government did come to know that
the [United States] State Department did not trust the claims in the September
dossier and that some of even their top experts did not believe them, should
they not have told parliament before asking the Commons to vote for war on a
false prospectus?"
Cook decided not to publish his diaries ahead of last week's Labour conference
in Bournemouth. Had he done so, his revelations would have ensured Blair
received a much tougher ride from activists, many of whom are deeply uneasy
about the war.
He reveals that in the months leading up to the war Downing Street aides,
including Alastair Campbell, Blair's former director of communications, and
Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, were obsessed with not falling out with
Washington.
Cook discloses that several cabinet ministers had held misgivings about the
war, not just himself and Clare Short. At a cabinet meeting in late February
2002, Blunkett asked for a discussion on Iraq and Cook received cries of
"hear, hear" from cabinet colleagues when he argued that Arab governments
regarded Israel, not Iraq, as the real problem for the Middle East. Cook
records it was "the nearest thing I've heard to a mutiny in cabinet".
His diary entry of March 7, 2002, a year before the war, says that Blunkett
and Patricia Hewitt, the trade secretary, raised objections at cabinet.
"A momentous moment. A real discussion at cabinet. Tony permitted us to have
the debate on Iraq which David [Blunkett] and I had asked for. For the first
time that I can recall in five years, Tony was out on a limb."
According to Cook, Blunkett asked Blair: "What has changed that suddenly gives
us the legal right to take military action that we didn't have a few months
ago?"
Hewitt warned Blair: "We are in danger of being seen as close to President
Bush, but without any influence over President Bush."
But the prime minister was "totally unfazed" and, when Hewitt again raised
objections at cabinet the following month, Blair refused to be boxed in,
telling colleagues: "The time to debate the legal base for our action should
be when we take that action."
Cook reveals that Bush had wanted to hold a crucial war council with Blair in
London on the weekend before the invasion of Iraq, a move that would have been
a public relations disaster given public hostility to the war. Blair persuaded
Bush to hold the summit in the Azores instead.
By September last year most of the cabinet had fallen into line. At cabinet on
September 23, before parliament was recalled from its summer break, Cook says:
"Personally I found it a grim meeting. Much of the two hours was taken up with
a succession of loyalty oaths for Tony's line."
He says only Estelle Morris, then education secretary, "bravely" reported
public disquiet that Britain was simply following Bush.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/